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Jurisdiction Size and Director Compensation in Connecticut Local Health
Departments
Abstract
Objective
Objective: To examine if the compensation of local public health directors responds to organizational size
in the same manner found for other types of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public managers.
Design
Design: Panel data ordinary least squares with fixed effects for the local health department and time
period. Control variables include median household income, the unemployment rate, and the part-time
versus full-time and independent versus district status of the local public health department.
Setting
Setting: Sample of Connecticut local health departments over the period from 2001 to 2011.
Main Outcome Measures
Measures: Annual wage of the local public health director and population in the
jurisdiction of the local public health department.
Results
Results: The size elasticity of local public health director equals 0.2. Full-time directors are paid more than
part-time directors and directors managing district health departments are compensated more than those
directing independent health departments. Directors are paid more if they manage health departments in
jurisdictions with higher levels of income.
Conclusion
Conclusions: The findings for the size elasticity of compensation for local public health directors
compares very closely to the size elasticity estimates found for other types of for-profit, not-for-profit, and
public managers, perhaps suggesting that local public health directors are similarly motivated.
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INTRODUCTION

N

o study to date has examined whether the compensation of local public health (LHD)
directors varies systematically with respect to organizational size, yet numerous studies
have investigated the effect of organizational size on the compensation of other types of
for-profit (FP), not-for-profit (NFP), and public managers. The strong relationship between firm
size and managerial pay is what some economists refer to as the "best-established empirical
regularity concerning executive compensation.”1 In fact, one meta-analysis evaluates the effect
of firm performance and organizational size on executive compensation, and concludes that more
than 40% of the variance in executive pay can be attributed to size, while less than 5% is due to
performance.2
The key statistic for this research is the elasticity of pay with respect to organizational size,
which reflects the percentage change in compensation resulting from a percentage change in
organizational size. Theoretically, this statistic is greater than zero because managers are
expected to be paid more when they operate larger organizations. Among the many reasons,
managers face a greater scope and breadth of responsibilities in larger organizations. For
example, larger organizations may produce more diverse products or cater to heterogeneous
consumers. In addition, larger companies may be organized in a hierarchical fashion, which adds
to the complexity of running the firm. Finally, directing large organizations may concern riskaverse managers and require a greater investment of their human capital.
Previous studies suggest that the size elasticity of compensation for chief executive officers
(CEOs) in industrial firms falls within the 0.2 to 0.3 range, whereas the comparable statistic for
CEOs of firms with more liquid assets, such those in the insurance, banking, or finance industry,
lie within the 0.1 to 0.2 range. For managers in the public sector such as superintendents of
schools, tax assessors, city managers, and tax collectors, the estimated size elasticities of
managerial compensation fall within a narrower range between 0.11 and 0.18. The comparable
estimates for NFP managers vary to a greater degree within a 0.1 to 0.7 range with those for
hospital CEOs at the higher end.
METHODS
Based on the previous literature, the relationship between jurisdiction size and the pay of the
LHD director is specified as:
log(𝑃𝐴𝑌)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 log(MHI)i,t +𝛽5 log(𝑈)𝑖,𝑡 (1)
where PAY equals the annual compensation of the LHD directors, SIZE is measured by the
population serviced by the various LHDs, PT and DIST are dummy variables reflecting whether
the LHDs are organized on a part-time basis or possess district status, MHI and U stand for the
median household income and unemployment rate in the area serviced by the LHDs, and the
subscripts i and t represent the specific LHD and year, respectively. Note that variables capturing
the personal attributes of the LHD directors would normally be specified if the data were
available. Because both PAY and SIZE are expressed as logarithms, the coefficient𝛽1 , reveals
the size elasticity of compensation for LHD director compensation.
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The sample includes 796 LHD observations in Connecticut over the 2001 to 2011 period for
which the necessary data are available. Included in those observations are 279 part-time, 310
full-time municipal, and 207 full-time district LHD-year observations. Given the two dummy
variables specified in Equation 1, it follows that the full-time municipal LHD serves as the
default specification. Part-time directors obviously work less and their compensation should
reflect the lower work load. Compared to full-time, independent LHDs, district LHDs work and
cooperate with representatives from many different towns and cities on their board of directors,
leading to additional implied responsibilities that may contribute to a higher level of
compensation, ceteris paribus.
Median household income and the unemployment rate control for two important economic
factors that may affect pay differentials across the various public health departments in
Connecticut and over time. For example, cities with higher levels of MHI may pay their directors
more because of the higher cost of living or because they value public health services more
greatly. Population figures are added and data for MHI and U are averaged across towns
participating in a regional district. Descriptive statistics and data sources are shown in Table 1
for all of the variables used in our analysis.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and data sources
Variable
Mean
Standard
Deviation
61,760
40,334
Annual Salary ($)
46,009
39,992
Population in the
Jurisdiction
0.35
NA
Part-time
Status
0.6
NA
District Status
76,655
27,955
Median Household
Income ($)
2.3
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.1

Minimum Maximum Data
Source
600
180,139
1
1,597
166,429
1
0

1

1

0
26,055

1
187,581

1
2

1

16.2

2

(1) Unpublished data, Connecticut Public Health Department
(2) Connecticut Economic Resource Center’s (CERC) Town Profiles, https://www.cerc.com/TownProfiles/

RESULTS
When estimating Equation 1, standard errors are made fully robust against arbitrary
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation by clustering them at the LHD level.3 LHD- and timefixed effects are also specified in the regression equation. The LHD-fixed effects help to control
for any unmeasurable time-invariant factors affecting the compensation of the directors across
the various LHDs such as housing values and citizen preferences and thereby help to reduce the
bias normally associated with unobservable heterogeneity. The time-fixed effects capture
changes common to all jurisdictions over time, such as general price inflation and technological
change.

https://uknowledge.uky.edu/frontiersinphssr/vol4/iss6/3
DOI: 10.13023/FPHSSR.0406.03

11

Lorenzo and Santerre: Jurisdiction Size and Director Compensation

The equations are estimated by the ordinary least squares technique for panel data. The second
column of Table 2 reports the multiple regression results. First note that over 95% of the
variation in the compensation of the directors can be explained by the various right-hand side
variables and the two fixed effects.
Table 2. Multiple regression results
Dependent variable: log of pay
Independent variable
Constant
Log of population
Part-time LHD
District LHD
Log of median household income
Log of unemployment rate

Adjusted R2
Observations

Estimated Coefficient
(absolute value of t-statistic)
3.84
(1.75)
0.21*
(2.11)
-1.22**
(9.73)
0.63*
(2.07)
0.49**
(2.88)
0.22**
(2.65)
0.954
796

**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level

As expected, the estimated coefficient on the part-time status variable is negative and highly
significant. Its coefficient means that part-time directors are paid about 70% less than otherwise
comparable full-time directors. Also as anticipated, the estimated coefficient on the full-time
district director dummy variable is positive and statistically different from zero. The relatively
large computed pay differential of 88% probably reflects that, in addition to workload and
responsibility level, the attributes of full-time independent and district directors also typically
differ. In addition, the empirical results suggest that directors are paid more in wealthier areas
and where the unemployment rate is higher.
More important for the research at hand, the estimated coefficient on the log of population equals
0.21. This means that a 10% increase in jurisdiction size increases director pay by about 2%.
Using sample averages, as shown in Table 1, simulations show that an increase in jurisdiction
size of approximately 4600 people raises the typical director’s pay by about $1200. This
estimated size elasticity for LHD directors is slightly higher than the size elasticity estimates for
other types of public administrators and near to the estimates found for industrial corporate
CEOs.
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IMPLICATIONS
The empirical analysis reveals that the pay of LHD directors responds directly to greater
jurisdiction size with an elasticity of approximately 0.2. This elasticity of director pay with
respect to jurisdiction size generally agrees with previous research analyzing the pay of other
administrators such as superintendents of schools, tax collectors and assessors, and hospital and
private industry CEOs, suggesting that local public health directors may be similarly motivated.
Taken as a whole, the literature on managerial compensation may suggest that the market for
managerial talent “works” at least in one respect.
Of course, the results of this paper reflect the relationship between director pay and
organizational size for LHDs in one relatively affluent state. Thus, other researchers, perhaps
those with data for the attributes of the LHD director and measures of director performance, are
encouraged to further explore this topic.

SUMMARY BOX
What is already known about this topic? While numerous studies have investigated the effect of
organizational size on the compensation of other types of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public
managers, no study to date has examined if the compensation of local public health (LHD) directors
varies systematically with respect to organizational size.
What is added by this report? This study finds empirically that the pay of LHD directors responds
directly to greater jurisdiction size with an elasticity of approximately 0.2, meaning that a 10% larger
jurisdiction pays its director about 2% more pay.
What are the implications for public health practice, policy, and research? This estimated elasticity
of director pay with respect to organizations size agrees with previous research analyzing the pay of
other types of managers which may suggest that local public health directors are similarly motivated
and that the market for managerial talent works at least in one respect.
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